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This paper investigates the determinants and information content of short 
selling in the Hong Kong equity market.  Using daily data on the volume of short 
selling in individual stocks, we find that dividend payments, company fundamentals, 
risk, option trading, the interest rate spread and past returns and short selling are all 
significant determinants of short selling.  Further, higher short selling in the current 
period is associated with higher returns in the next period.  Once short sellers reduce 
their activity in the market however, negative returns are expected to follow.   
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There is widespread empirical and theoretical evidence to suggest that short 
sellers are integral to the efficient functioning of financial markets. For example, the 
market completion hypothesis suggests that short selling facilitates the process of 
price discovery and speeds up the rate at which the market processes information (see 
inter alia Miller 1987, Diamond and Verrecchia 1987, Raab and Schwager, 1993 and 
Figlewski and Webb, 1993).  More recent evidence is provided by Jones and Lamont 
(2002), Chareonrook and Daouk (2004, 2005) Chang and Yu (2004), and Jiang (2005) 
who conclude that restrictions on short sales compromise the ability of the market to 
efficiently incorporate bad news in asset prices resulting in an upward price bias.  Ali 
and Trombley (2006) show that short sales constraints are positively related to the 
magnitude of momentum in stock returns.  Reed (2003) finds that short sales 
constraints reduce the speed at which asset prices adjust in response to the arrival of 
private information.  Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) find that short selling leads to 
more efficient price discovery at the individual security level based on a global study 
of 47 equity markets.   
In addition to promoting market efficiency, short selling is also thought to be 
integral to the formation of rational asset prices.  The standard assumption of 
unrestricted lending and borrowing at the risk free rate in the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) is thought to be unrealistic giving existing constraints to short selling.  
Black (1972) shows that the mean-variance efficiency of the market portfolio in the 
absence of a riskless security is preserved where unrestricted short sales are allowed 
(for further discussion see Kwan 1995, Charpin and Lacaze 1999, Elton and Gruber, 
2000, Fama and French, 2004 inter alia).  Levy and Ritov (2001) show that the 
optimal mean-variance-efficient portfolio is composed of short positions in about half 
of the assets held.  Further, they estimate that the Sharpe ratio can be more than 
double in the presence of constraints on short positions.  Kempf (1996) finds that 
short selling restrictions are very influential determinants of the behaviour of 
mispricing.  In fact, Rubenstein (2004) argues that short sales are so integral to the 
validity of the CAPM, that a wide range of well documented capital pricing anomalies 
may be attributed to restrictions on this type of trading strategy. 
A number of papers have considered the informational content of short sales 
and the general consensus is that short sellers may possess superior information 
relative to other traders (see Angel, Christophe and Ferri, 2003, Boehmer, Jones and 
  2Zhang, 2005, Cohen, Diether and Malloy, 2005, and Francis, Venkatachalam and 
Zhang, 2005 inter alia). For example, Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2005) employ 
proprietary data on rebate fees and quantities of securities available for lending to 
construct measures of supply and demand in the market for shorting equity, finding 
that shorting demand is an economically and statistically significant predictor of 
future stock returns for a sample of monthly US stocks.   
Given the importance of short sellers to the efficient functioning of markets, it 
is interesting to note that relatively little is known about the determinants of their 
behaviour.  Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) hypothesised that short selling may be 
motivated by speculation, arbitrage and taxation issues surrounding the deferment of 
capital gains.  Using US data sampled over the period 1974 – 1986, they test each of 
these three factors in turn. Using the variance of analysts’ forecasts as a measure of 
the heterogeneity of investor beliefs, speculative trading was not found to be a 
significant determinant of short selling. However, as stocks with high betas, options 
and convertible securities were found to exhibit significantly higher levels of short 
sales there was evidence in favour of arbitrage motivating short sales.  Finally, the 
authors found evidence of a December seasonal providing limited
1 support for the 
taxation hypothesis.  
A major limitation of the Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) paper arises from its 
use of monthly data on open short interest.  Since the majority of short selling volume 
may be attributed to short term trading strategies, the use of monthly data has obvious 
implications for the ability of this study to capture the effect of daily or even intra-
monthly short sales trading strategies. Only recently has a higher frequency 
investigation of the determinants of short selling been forthcoming.  Diether, Lee and 
Werner (2005) employ daily data sampled in the first quarter of 2005 for a cross 
section of 2185 US equities.  They find that short sellers are contrarian in nature and 
tend to sell short following a price increase. There is evidence that the activities of 
short sellers contain information about future returns, but this is not sufficient to 
generate profits. Finally, the authors find evidence that increasing the constraints on 
short sales leads to reduced short selling, but this only limits the information content 
about future returns in low prices equities. While Diether Lee and Werner’s (2005) 
                                                           
1 Capital gains or losses were not a significant determinant of the reduction in short interest in January 
which diminished the significance of the December seasonal as evidence of this tax hypothesis. 
  3use of daily data presents an improvement over the Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) 
paper, their analysis is restricted to a fairly limited sample of only one quarter of data.    
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical assessment of the 
determinants and information content of short selling. While the bulk of the previous 
literature has considered US short sales data
2, in this paper daily short sales 
information for Hong Kong stocks is considered.
3  Using data from the Hong Kong 
market offers a number of other distinct advantages in the current context.  The first 
such advantage relates to the quality and quantity of short sales information. Daily 
data are available from 1994 onwards on a range of stocks approved for short selling, 
unlike the USA where market-wide short sales data is limited to monthly frequency. 
The second advantage of the Hong Kong data is that many of the stocks that are 
eligible for short selling in Hong Kong also have options traded.  Option trading is 
closely linked to short sales trading and the Hong Kong market provides the 
opportunity to explicitly control for the level of short selling linked to option trading 
(see Senchack and Starks, 1993). Thirdly, there is extensive short selling in equity in 
Hong Kong, with short selling occurring on 51% (91%) of trading days in our sample 
for the least (most) traded stock. Moreover, short selling makes up 7.7% of average 
daily volume in Hong Kong over the sample period considered (see section 3 below 
for further details). Fourthly, the continuous, order driven nature of the market is a 
very simple, with no clearing transactions at open or close, and no specialists. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a 
summary of the institutional arrangements for short selling in Hong Kong. Section 3 
discusses the empirical design employed in this study. The fourth section presents the 
econometric model, while section 5 describes the data.  Evidence on the determinants 
of short selling is discussed on the sixth section. Section seven considers whether 
short sellers are momentum or contrarian traders. The penultimate section examines 
the information content of short sales for future returns. The final section presents 
some concluding comments. 
                                                           
2 One notable exception is Ho (1996) which considered short selling in the context of the Singapore 
market and found that volatility increased as a result of a change in the rules which restricted short 
selling. 
3 Similar data has previously been the focus of research in Chang and Yu (2004) and Henry and 
McKenzie (2006). 
  42 Institutional  Detail 
Hong Kong has a long history of securities trading with records dating back to 
1866 and the formation of the Association of Stockbrokers in Hong Kong in 1891 
which was later renamed the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) in 1914.  Although 
the HKSE has faced competition from a number of competing exchanges over the 
years, currently it is the sole stock exchange in the region (see Brockman and Chung, 
1998, for further details).  More recently, the HKSE merged with the Hong Kong 
Futures Exchange and the Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company to form Hong 
Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) and was publicly listed on the HKSE 
in June 2000. 
The trading environment of the HKSE represents one of the simplest forms of 
market making procedures of any exchange in the global financial arena – the 
exchange has no opening call market, no price controls, no liquidity providers or 
specialists and no special arrangements for closing.  The exchange is an order driven 
market with continuous trading during opening hours whereby designated members 
place limit orders into the Automatic Order Matching and Execution System (AMS) 
which are prioritised by price and executed in order of time of arrival to the 
exchange.
4 
The HKSE first introduced short selling in January 1994, in a pilot program 
which designated 17 eligible stocks.  Under the new rules,
5 investors were able to sell 
short provided they have an exercisable and unconditional right to vest the stock and 
the trade was not to be made at a price below the best current ask price (the ‘tick 
rule’). The tick rule is enforced by the exchange through its AMS system and the 
members of the exchange have an obligation to establish whether or not the client 
meets these vesting rules prior to placing the order (HKSE Eleventh Schedule, Point 
7).  Penalties exist for both the member and the investor for failing to comply with 
these rules and although the exchange investigates hundreds of transactions each year, 
only a few result in prosecution.
6  
In 1995, naked short selling was allowed on the sale of any securities effected 
under a stock option and stock option market makers were exempted from the margin 
                                                           
4 See Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001) for a summary of the HK order book. 
5 The short selling rules on the HKSE are less restrictive compared to those in the US (see Asquith and 
Muelbroek, 1996 for a summary). 
6 In 1997, the HKSE conducted 764 investigations and prosecuted in 15 instances (So, 1998 and Leung, 
2000). 
  5requirement and the up-tick rule.  The tick rule was abandoned altogether in March, 
1996 and the list of stocks which could be short sold increased to 113.
7 In August 
1998, the Hong Kong government spent US$12.5b buying stocks and futures to 
support the market which was labouring under heavy speculative selling pressure.  To 
curb future short selling and prevent a repeat of previous events, a host of new rules 
were introduced in September, 1998 including the reinstatement of the tick rule, 
although the exemption remained for short sales transactions undertaken by stock 
options market makers in the course of performing their duty. 
All short selling transactions are identified to the exchange by the broker at the 
time the order is placed in the AMS.  This information is then made available to the 
market via the limit order book which flags all short sales.  In addition, exchange 
members are also required to keep a ledger with specific details of each individual 
short selling transactions and this must be made available to the exchange at any time.  
As such, detailed short sales records are kept for trades made on the HKSE and the 
exchange makes this information available in the form of a daily report.  This report 
summarises total daily short sales volume and short sales value for each individual 
stock and is usually made available after a 24 hour delay. 
 
3  Empirical Design 
In a general sense, the desire to short sell is typically motivated either by 
information or non-information based reasons.  In a rational expectations model, such 
as that of Diamond and Verrechia (1987), new information about an asset will be 
quickly and accurately impounded into the price, thus any negative information will 
lead to price falls. In the tax-based strategies discussed by Brent, Morse and Stice 
(1990) or informing hedge portfolios, Ross (1976), it is not necessary that new 
information motivates the desire to sell short. 
 
3.1   Non-Information based trading 
To hold securities without incurring market risk, an investor can offset their 
existing long positions with equivalent short positions leaving them neutral to the 
                                                           
7 Prior to 1998 the list of designated securities was announced annually. Since 1998 however, these 
announcements occur three times a year although there is no fixed month for designation and 
disqualification announcements.  Leung, Rui and Wang (2007) use designation and disqualification 
announcements between May 1996 and December 2000 to examine the effects of short sale constraints 
on stock price movements using an event study approach 
  6market.  This strategy is frequently referred to as selling short against the box or 
‘shorting the box’ and it is useful to investors for a number of reasons, amongst the 
most important of which are tax avoidance, ex-dividend effects, hedging, arbitrage 
and derivatives trading. 
Shorting the box is effective for locking in the profit on a position while 
deferring capital gains tax (alternatively, it can be used to defer capital losses to the 
following year).  Further, where the tax rates on short term profits were different to 
those on long term profits (as was the case in the US prior to 1950), shorting against 
the box could be used to manipulate the timing of profits as a tax minimization 
strategy.  Any of these factors may induce seasonality into short sales around the end 
of financial year.   
Shorting the box is also useful for investors who need to realize their position 
but also wish to accrue an upcoming dividend without suffering any capital losses due 
to the price fall as the share goes ex-dividend.  In this case, shorting the box allows 
the investor to lock in the profits to their position, accrue the dividend, yet avoid the 
price fall as the market adjusts for the share going ex.  In that sense, lower short sales 
activity may be related to dividend ex-dates. 
Derivative issuers and stock options market makers may short sell to hedge 
their price risk, in which case their net positions is market neutral.  Further, where 
fund managers feel that a correction is imminent, their options are fairly limited as 
they must remain ‘in the market’. Managers may have some discretion to increase 
their cash holdings (typically set at a maximum of 5 to 10 percent of total portfolio 
value) and/or engage in strategic asset reallocation (stocks to bonds in a diversified 
fund or aggressive to passive stocks in an equity fund).  The limits on asset allocation 
however, typically mean that managers’ ability to reduce their market exposure is 
limited.  Alternatively, some markets or assets may have minimum holding periods.  
In either case, shorting the box is one strategy by which investors can effectively 
reduce their exposure to the market yet remain fully invested.  By simultaneously 
taking a long and a short position, market participants can hold a position in the 
marketplace and lock in profits without further risk from unfavorable asset price 
movements.
8  
                                                           
8 The evidence of Almazan, Brown and Carlson (2004) suggests that most fund managers do not 
engage in this type of activity.  They report that 70% of fund managers are not able to take short 
  7Short selling can be used to exploit profitable arbitrage opportunities in the 
market.  This trading strategy typically involves some form of pairs trading whereby 
the relative price of highly correlated assets has diverged from equilibrium (long/short 
hedge funds typically employ this type of strategy).  By buying the stock whose price 
has gone down and shorting the stock whose price has gone up, profits can be made 
when the spread converges back to its long run equilibrium.  This strategy may also 
apply to a basket of stocks.  For example, market participants may short sell the 
underlying stocks of an index futures contract for arbitrage purposes.  This type of 
trading strategy is also used to generate profits from firms engaged in mergers and 
acquisitions activity.  Investors will often trade short the acquiring firm and take a 
long position in the target firm.  
While shorting the box in its own right cannot yield any profits, in the 
presence of a third asset whose value is linked to the cash market, opportunities for 
arbitrage profits exist.  The most obvious candidates for this are futures, options or if 
the stocks are sufficiently large, market index derivatives themselves.  Thus, the 
existence of such securities may promote short selling.  The direction of the 
relationship will depend on how options are used.  On the one hand, options may be 
considered a substitute for short selling.  In this case the options market provides an 
alternative venue for exploiting information and a lower cost means of establishing a 
short position with a written call and a long put).  On the other hand, options may be 
used in conjunction with short sales as a part of an overall trading strategy.  For 
example, for an options trader who writes a put, a short position can be used to cover 
the market risk of this position.  
 
3.2   Information based trading 
While a number of non-information based hypothesis can be justified to 
motivate short selling, speculation is thought to be the primary reason for the use of 
short trading strategies.  For example, McDonald and Baron (1973) cite the results of 
a 1947 New York Stock Exchange survey in which approximately two thirds of short 
selling was speculative.  It is interesting to note however, that the traditional view of 
short sellers trading on negative (and presumably inside) information about a 
company’s prospects may not be valid.  Instead, Francis, Venkatachalam and Zhang 
                                                                                                                                                                      
positions and only 1/3 of the remaining 30% do.  Hedge fund mangers however, are able to take such 
positions.    
  8(2005) produce evidence to suggest that short sellers are more likely to trade on 
misperceptions held by the market about the fundamentals of a firm. Dechow, Hutton, 
Muelbroek and Sloan (2001) and Christophe, Ferri and Angel (2004) argue that firms 
with low ratios of fundamentals are known to have systematically lower future stock 
returns. Thus, traders may monitor firm’s fundamentals and sell firms as their 
fundamentals fall.  The literature suggests that the relevant set of fundamentals may 
include earnings per share, book to market values and dividend yields.   
The heterogeneity of the market perceptions of a firm’s fundamentals may also 
be related to the degree of short selling experienced by a firm.  To the extent that 
market participants diverge in their estimation of the value of a firm, those who 
believe the firm is overvalued may be motivated to sell short.  Where a (near) 
consensus is held by the market however, little motivation exists for short selling.  
One proxy which may capture the heterogeneity of market perceptions is the 
distribution of analysts’ coverage.  The use of such a measure however, raises 
questions as to whether the distribution of analysts beliefs is representative of the 
distribution of the beliefs of all investors (need a reference about the convergence of 
analysts beliefs here).  An alternative proxy is market volatility.  If the volatility of 
returns is relatively low, this might suggest an absence of new information for a 
company and/or less divergent beliefs about its fundamentals.  On the other hand, a 
company whose returns are relatively more volatile would suggest a wide dispersion 
of beliefs and/or a heavy flow of new information about the future prospects for the 
firm.   
Broadly speaking, we may distinguish between information based traders and 
technical traders as the latter group typically apply some form of trading rule to past 
price information to make trading decisions.  Distinguishing between contrarians and 
positive feedback traders, the former will sell short following positive returns in the 
expectation of a price fall in the next period (evidence of this type of behavior may be 
found in Diether, Lee and Werner, 2005).  A positive feedback trader however, would 
extrapolate any trend into the next period.  As such, they would sell short following a 
price fall with the expectation of another negative return in the next period. Evidence 
  9of extrapolative behaviour in NYSE and NASDAQ short interest is discussed by 
Lamont and Stein (1994).
9   
Another possibility is that technical traders may base their decisions on 
general market movements rather than those of individual stocks, in which case short 
selling may be related to market returns. The nature of this relationship however, is 
not clear.  Where short sellers trade on momentum, they would be less active in rising 
markets.  Lamont and Stein (2004) find that total short selling moves counter 
cyclically, that is, short selling falls as the market approaches its peak. This evidence 
could be taken as support for the view (attributed to Keynes) that the market can 
remain irrational for longer than a trader can remain solvent.  Alternatively, Asensio 
(2001) argues that “(a) bull market is a fertile ground for short sellers”. As such, short 
selling could increase as a market approaches its peak and these positions would profit 
from the correction.  
In addition to stock and market returns, short sales themselves may be a factor 
in determining current short interest.  Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) note that some 
investors pursue a trading strategy in which they buy and sell securities based on their 
level of short interest. A relatively high level of short sales suggests high future 
demand for the stock as short sellers must close out their positions and buy the stock.  
Thus, short sales will decline following a period of spirited short selling. 
A final variable which may explain the informational based demand for short 
interest relates to the discount factor used to value equity.  An increase in the Hong 
Kong – US interest rate spread suggests Hong Kong equities will become relatively 
less attractive in the eyes of investors.  To the extent this leads to a downward revision 
in Hong Kong share prices, traders may attempt to capitalize on this movement by 
selling Hong Kong stocks short. 
 
4  Econometric Methodology 
Section 3 suggests a number of factors which are thought to determine short 
sales.  Firstly, the non-information based trading motivations for short selling suggest 
the presence of seasonal factors in the data.  As such, the model may be specified with 
binary monthly dummy variables to capture this effect.  A second variable is the ex-
                                                           
9 This issue is further complicated when we recognise that the existence of both types of traders in the 
market.  The relative strength of these two groups in the market may mean that the signals of each may 
cancel out, and so no effect may be found.   
  10date of the stock.  As a form of robustness test the dividend payment date is also 
included and this coefficient is not expected to be significant.   A binary dummy 
variable is used to capture the occurrence of each of these events.  
Market risk may also be an important factor, firstly by motivating short sales 
aimed at reducing exposure to market risk though hedging, but also indicating the 
heterogeneity of investor’s beliefs about the value of a stock.  Either factor suggests a 
positive relationship between volatility and short selling.  Unfortunately, market risk 
cannot be directly observed and so a proxy variable must be used.  In this context, a 
number of candidates exist including GARCH based risk estimates, option implied 
volatilities and, in the absence of high frequency data from which to estimate realized 
volatilities, intra-daily trading range.  In this paper, all three are to be considered.  For 
the former, risk is defined as the fitted values of the conditional variance from a 
GARCH(1,1) model estimated using returns data over the sample period.  While 
GARCH models have proven popular in the literature, recent evidence suggests that 
implied volatilities are superior (see Martens and Zein, 2003, and references therein).  
The use of implied estimates of volatility however, is complicated by the presence of 
the well documented volatility smile and most studies typically take some form of 
average across a selection of contracts (see Ederington and Guan, 2002).  As such, an 
equally weighted average of implied volatility across all options contracts for a given 
stock is used.  One problem with such a measure is it includes an element of 
redundant information, since not all contracts have sufficient liquidity to ensure that 
trades occur each day.  As such, a second implied volatility series is included which is 
the implied volatility taken from the most heavily traded option contract each day, 
based on volume of trade.  A final measure of risk is the trading range (price high less 
price low each day).  
Short selling may be linked to hedging strategies involving options.  In this 
study, net open interest for individual stock options is included as an explanatory 
variable for short selling.  Further, as both types of options can be used for arbitrage, 
the explanatory power of open interest in puts and calls may also be tested separately.  
Open interest will exhibit strong seasonality induced by the monthly contract 
expiration cycle.  As such, the open interest data is prewhitened by regressing it 
against a monthly time trend variable.  This prewhitened data is included in the test 
equations.  Option activity may not only be reflected in open interest however, but 
  11also in the number of trades.  As such, the total number of trades in an individual 
share option is also included as an explanatory variable.   
Following Diether, Lee and Werner (2005) inter alia, a pooled regression 
approach is taken to estimating the functional relationships of the determinants of 
short selling.  Further, due to potential problems with multicollinearity (in particular 
between the stock risk variables, the company fundamentals as well as the options 
trading activity variables), a hierarchical regression approach is adopted in which 
variables within the model are considered in turn.  As such, a generic model of the 










0        (1) 
where ssit  is the logarithm of short sales trading volume for company i on day t, X is a 
vector of j independent variables that theory suggests may determine the level of short 
selling, Dk are month of the year dummies (1 = January), α and β are parameters to be 
estimated and εt are the errors which are assumed ~N(0,1). 
 
5  Data 
To be eligible for inclusion in this study a stock had to be included in the Hang 
Seng Index, be designated eligible for short selling and had to have options traded 
over the entire sample period.  This criterion led to the inclusion of 17 stocks in the 
sample and daily short sales information for each stock is sampled over the period 
January, 2001 to April, 2006.  This sample period is deliberately chosen so as to avoid 
the naked short selling period and also to ensure sufficient time had passed to allow 
the Hong Kong Authorities to unwind their positions taken during the August 1998 
intervention (see Goodhart and Dai, 2003).  In addition to the level of short sales 
volume, individual stock information and options data are also gathered over the same 
period.  The short sales and options data was sourced directly from the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange.  All individual share data, as well as the market index are sourced 
from Datastream, as were the interest rates which were cross referenced to the US 
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database to ensure accuracy. 
- Table 1 about here - 
The continuously compounded daily total returns to each individual stock and 
to the Hang Seng index are obtained by taking the log price relative of each series, 
  12adjusted for dividend payments.  Panel A of Table 1 presents some summary statistics 
of this information as well as the name, and stock code of the 17 companies included 
in the sample.  The average return for 6 of the 17 companies is negative and the 
lowest mean returns were –0.11% for PCCW and –0.04% for Lenovo.  The price of 
these stocks declined over the entire sample period by 79% and 57% respectively.
10  
In general, Hong Kong stock prices exhibit a great deal of variation with a one day 
positive and negative returns of in excess of 10% common to the sample.  Lenovo 
experienced the largest one day fall of 15.16% on 12/9/01 when the price fell from 
$3.20 to $2.75.  The standard deviation for these returns is quite high relative to the 
mean return and for five stocks exceeded 2%.  Not surprisingly, the Jarque-Bera test 
for normality was rejected overwhelmingly in each instance.   
Panel B of Table 1 presents summary information for the short sales data used 
in this study.  The first column of Panel B summarises the percentage of days on 
which the short selling occurs across the sample period.  SHK Property was sold short 
most frequently in this sample of stocks, with trades occurring on 91.05% days in our 
sample, while CITIC only experienced short selling on roughly half the days in the 
sample 57.26%.   
Early studies into the information content of short sales could not establish a 
significant relationship (Figlewski, 1981; Woolridge and Dickinson, 1994; Brent, 
Morse and Stice, 1990; and Figlewski and Webb, 1993).  Asquith and Meulbroek 
(1996) argue that the principle reason for this failure is because the level of short 
selling was too small to be of consequence. As such, it is important for any study to 
consider the level of short sales relative to the market in which they are traded.  In 
general, the data considered in this paper suggests that short selling is a significant 
feature of Hong Kong's financial markets.  As evidence of this, we can report that 
over the period 1999 – 2005, short selling in Hong Kong has increased at an average 
rate of 37% per annum and short interest constitutes 7.7% of daily traded volume on 
average.  
 Table 2 summarises information on the level of short sales relative to the 
daily traded volume as well as the number of shares on issue across days on which 
short sales occurred.  The average level of short sales relative to traded volume ranges 
                                                           
10 Share trading in PCCW was suspended in July, 2006 (after the end of the sample period) and the 
company is currently involved in buyout negotiations.  The results and conclusions of this paper are 
unaltered where PCCW is excluded from the analysis. 
  13from 4.464% for CITIC to 8.617% for PCCW.   The maximum short sales relative to 
traded volume ranges from 35.583% for Hutchison to 67.969% for Bank of East Asia 
and the minimum ranges from less than 0.01% for a number of companies to 0.03% 
for China Resources.  In terms of the level of short sales relative to outstanding 
shares, Table 2 reveals that the average level of short selling relative to shares 
outstanding estimated across all days on which short sales occurred ranged from 
0.006% for China Mobile to 0.24% for PCCW and 0.23% for Lenovo.  The maximum 
observation is recorded for PCCW (0.38%).   
- Figure 1 about here - 
Figure 1 presents a plot of the total daily short sales volume across all 17 
stocks included in the sample as well as the Hang Seng Index.  Overall, the sample 
period is characterized by bearish market conditions for the first half of the sample 
and bullish market conditions for the second half.  This is an important feature of this 
study as it means the estimation results are taken across a range of market conditions.  
The early part of the sample is characterized by noticeably higher levels of short 
selling compared to the rest of the sample.  This is consistent with the notion of 
Lamont and Stein (2004) that short selling moves counter cyclically.   
- Figure 2 about here - 
To gain a more intuitive feel for the relative magnitude of short selling across 
the sample stocks, Figure 2 presents the level of accumulated short selling for a 
selection of companies in the sample.
11  The stock with the highest level of 
accumulated short selling is PCCW which had 3,723m shares sold short over the 
entire sample period.  The total level of short interest in PCCW is more than double 
that of Lenovo and China Mobile, which were the stocks with the next highest short 
sales volume.  A further group of three stocks New World, Hutchison, HSBC and 
SHK have relatively smaller levels of short sales.  The remainder of the sample of 
stocks may be grouped together with Henderson and CLP representing the highest and 
lowest short sold stocks of this final group.  
- Table 3 about here - 
One possible trading strategy involving short sales is to buy and sell securities 
based on their level of short interest. Where this is the case, positive and significant 
levels of autocorrelation should be observable in short sales data.  Table 3 presents up 
                                                           
11 Note that the y-axis is truncated to accommodate PCCW yet still allow sufficient detail in the plots of 
the other stocks. 
  14to the 10
th order autocorrelation coefficient for short selling for each stock in the 
sample and clear evidence of significant autocorrelation is found in the data.  The first 
and second order autocorrelation coefficient is positive and significant for all 17 
stocks.  Further, the autocorrelation coefficient at lag 3 is significant for 11 of the 
stocks.  The degree of autocorrelation in short selling is quite persistent for some 
stocks, with 6 companies generating a positive and significant autocorrelation 
coefficient at lag 10.  Thus, the short sales volume data has clear evidence of positive 
autocorrelation which is supportive of the view that short sellers may trade based on 
past short volume information.  Where short sales are interpreted as a signal of future 
demand (short sellers must close out their positions by buying the stock back), 
negative autocorrelation should be evident in the data. It is therefore interesting to 
note that no significant negative autocorrelation coefficients are evident in Table 3.  
This suggests that either short selling cannot be used to infer future price increases or 
short sellers hold their positions for longer than 10 trading days. 
- Table 4 about here- 
To the extent that market risk is important for asset pricing, short selling 
across the stocks in the sample may exhibit positive correlation.  This is because 
bearish conditions in the market signal unfavourable prospects for all stocks, in which 
case a general increase in short sales volume across all stocks may result.  Where the 
market is bullish, stock prices are expected to increase and speculative short sales 
volume may decline.  Further, the tax loss hypothesis also suggests short selling may 
be correlated during certain times of the year. Table 4 presents a correlation matrix for 
the short sales volume data and in general, the estimates are quite low.  The maximum 
correlation coefficient is 0.26 between Hang Seng Bank and HK electric.  The average 
correlation coefficient however, is only 0.07 and numerous instances of negative 
correlations are observed.  Thus, this evidence tends to suggest that general market 
conditions may not have a role to play in determining the level of short selling.  This 
issue is considered more formally in the next section.   
Although the stocks included in the sample are all large, heavily traded and 
well known Hong Kong stocks, the above analysis clearly establishes the 
heterogeneous nature of short selling across the sample in terms of trading volume 
and frequency.  To account for the possibility of such size effects, the measure of 
short sales in equation (1) may be specified using a variable that is normalised across 
stocks.  To this end, the Short Interest Ratio (SIR) is defined as total short sales 
  15volume relative to total traded volume.  In the analysis that follows, equation (1) shall 
be tested using both raw short sales and SIR data and any differences discussed.  
 
6  The Determinants of Short Selling 
In this paper, we argue that short sales volumes are a function of a number of 
information and non-information based factors.  Equation (1) presents a stylized form 
of pooled testing equation in which each of these factors are proxied by a number of 
different variables.  Due to potential problems with multicolinearity, each variable is 
tested in turn and a parsimonious model of short sales constructed.  As a starting point 
for analysis, Table 5 presents the estimation results where the log of short sales is 
specified as the dependent variable.  
- Table 5 about here - 
The first model estimated included a lagged dependent variable and month-of- 
the-year dummy variables.  The seasonal dummy coefficients are not reported (for this 
or any other model estimated) to conserve space
12.  In general, the results may be 
compactly summarized by stating that while individual monthly dummy coefficients 
were significant, there was no systematic pattern of short sales for any of the models 
tested. As such, tax arbitrage does not appear to be a significant motivation for short 
sellers in Hong Kong. The lagged short sales coefficient is positive and highly 
significant, which is to be expected given the evidence of serial correlation in table 3.  
The overall explanatory power of the equation is 26% and the Durbin Watson statistic 
suggests a lack of significant time dependent structure in the errors.   
The second column of table 5 reports estimation results for an extended model 
which included a dummy variable for the ex-dividend date. The lagged dependent 
variable was again positive and highly significant.  The ex-dividend date dummy was 
also significant and the negative sign on the coefficient suggests that lower short sales 
are observed on the date the share goes ex dividend. As a form of robustness test, the 
model was re-estimated with the dividend payment date instead of the ex-dividend 
date.  This coefficient is not expected to be significant as there is no advantage to 
short selling on the payment date.  The results presented in the third column of Table 
5 reveal that the coefficient is insignificant as expected.  Thus, the evidence suggests 
that short sales fall on the day the share goes ex-dividend. 
                                                           
12 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
  16The next series of variables to be included in the model were chosen to capture 
the fundamentals of the firm.  Recall that firms with lower fundamentals are expected 
to have a higher level of short sales in anticipation of poor future price performance. 
Thus, as fundamentals fall, short sales should increase suggesting a negative 
coefficient.  Dividend Yield, Earnings per Share and Book to Market Value are all 
tested in turn in the model and each estimated coefficient was individually significant 
and negative, with the R
2 value for the model incorporating the dividend yield being 
highest of the three models considered. Further, where all three variables were 
simultaneously included, only the dividend yield remained significant and retained its 
sign. As such, the dividend yield was retained in the model to capture firm 
fundamentals and the other variables were excluded.   
Risk is thought to be an important factor in determining short selling, as risk 
increases, the benefit to hedging rises and so the incentive to sell short may increase. 
Additionally, where the heterogeneity of investor expectations is reflected in the firms 
share price volatility, more short selling is expected in stocks with relatively higher 
price risk. The alternative measures of risk were considered in this paper; the first is 
an estimate of the time varying conditional of the returns obtained from a 
GARCH(1,1). The second measure is the daily trading range, the difference between 
the highest and lowest price at each date in the sample. The final measure is obtained 
from the implied volatility taken from either the most heavily traded option or the 
average across all traded options. Each of these proxies for risk was included in turn 
and all generated a positive and significant coefficient which is consistent with higher 
risk stocks exhibiting higher levels of short selling.  Of these four measures of risk, 
the implied volatility is retained as the literature suggests that they provide the most 
accurate volatility forecasts (see Day and Lewis, 1993, Jorion, 1995 and Christensen 
and Prabhala, 1998).  The use of the implied volatility from the most heavily traded 
option and the average implied volatility across all listed options does not impact on 
the tenor of the results (in this and all other estimated models), and so the former is 
chosen as it does not incorporate redundant volatility information from thinly traded 
options contracts.  
The work of arbitragers in the market frequently involves simultaneous trading 
in options and short selling of the underlying asset.  To test the relationship between 
options trading and short selling, the log of the total open interest across all listed 
options was included in the model.  The results support the conjecture that open 
  17interest is a positive and significant determinant of short selling.  This suggests that 
the more heavily traded are the options on an individual equity, the greater will be the 
volume of short sales, all else equal. It is interesting to retest open interest by 
distinguishing between open interest on the call and the put option. The estimation 
results indicate that while both are positive and significant, put option open interest is 
three times more influential on the level of short selling. Recall from the discussion in 
section 3 that arbitrage may involve long and short positions in put contracts but only 
short positions in call contracts.
13 Thus, this asymmetry may reflect the heavier 
concentration of short sales activity being linked to put option trading.   
An alternative measure of the effect of options trading may be a measure of 
the number of trades in the options market.  Thus, the log of the number of trades as 
well as an equivalent measure of the number of trades in the call and the put were 
included in the model.  The results indicate that higher trading activity in the options 
market is associated with high levels of short volume.  Distinguishing between calls 
and puts, and the number of trades in both are found to exert a positive and significant 
influence on short selling.  A Wald test of coefficient equality suggests that the two 
estimated coefficients are not statistically significantly different from each other.   
Where open interest and trading volume are jointly included in the model, both retain 
their signs and remain significant, although the estimated coefficient for the number 
of trades is noticeably lower in value.   
Where technical traders are present in the market, past stock price and market 
information may influence the level of short trading. To test this possibility, the model 
was augmented to include a one period lagged stock return term and the estimated 
coefficient was positive and significant.  Thus, a positive (negative) price movement 
suggests higher (lower) levels of short selling in the following period.  This result is 
suggestive of contrarian trading being the dominant strategy employed by short sellers 
where they rely on price reversals to create profitable opportunities.   
In addition to short trading based on idiosyncratic information, market wide 
information, as measured by the total return to the Hang Seng Index, may also be 
used.  That is, a general increase in short interest across stocks may be observed 
where the market sentiment turns bearish. The estimated model generated a positive 
and significant coefficient estimate. Recall, the short selling correlation information 
                                                           
13 Option trading based on speculation of a price fall however, may manifest on one side of either 
option. 
  18presented earlier suggests the comovement in short positions across stocks is low.  
Thus, this significant result runs somewhat counter-intuitive to the correlation 
information.  Recall, however, that our sample represents half of the stocks included 
in the index.  Thus, individual stock movements will have an important bearing on the 
direction of the market and so, these two variables are capturing similar information. 
To test this possibility, the model was estimated with both stock specific and market-
wide return measures included and the results (not reported) show that only the 
individual returns remained significant. We therefore exclude the returns to the Hang 
Seng Index and specify the model with individual stock returns.   
The final independent variable tested in the model is the interest rate spread.  
The model is estimated using the 3 month Hong Kong – US interest rate differential 
and the estimated results show that this variable is insignificant.
14  Where the 3 year 
spread is specified (not reported), the same outcome is produced.   
The outcome of this hierarchical procedure yields the model presented in the 
last column of Table 5 which brings all of the significant factors together from the 
previous analysis.
15  Short selling on the stocks in the sample is specified as a 
function of past short selling, dividend payments, company fundamentals proxied by 
dividend yield, risk measured by implied volatility, option market activity and past 
stock returns.  The estimated model has an explanatory power of 30% and all of the 
coefficients have consistent signs and retain their significance (except for the ex-
dividend date dummy which is significant at the 10% level).   
One possible criticism of the previous model is that it specifies log short sales 
volume as the dependent variable. Figure 2 shows how the short sales data for the 
companies included in this study varies markedly over the sample period and it is 
possible that size effects may be present in this data, that is, the results may be unduly 
influenced by the larger companies in the sample. To address the robustness of the 
results to any such bias a model with the SIR as the dependent variable was estimated 
and the results are presented in Table 6.  
- Table 6 about here - 
                                                           
14 The 3 year spread was also tested and the results are unchanged.  They are not presented to conserve 
space. 
15 This hierarchical type approach to modeling touches on issues which are currently being developed 
in the general-to-specific modeling literature (see Campos, Ericsson and Hendry, 2005).  The most 
pertinent issue for this paper is the possibility that the results are dependent on the order in which the 
variables are introduced into the model.  Unreported results confirm the robustness of these results to 
the ordering of the determinants of short selling. 
  19Considering each variable in turn, the results in Table 6 reveal that lagged SIR 
are important in explaining the variance in the current SIR. The dividend cycle of the 
stocks in the sample was not found to be a significant influence on the SIR. This result 
stands in contrast to the raw short selling results previously discussed. Each of the 
three company fundamental variables are negative and significant when tested 
individually.  Where they were jointly included, the dividend yield and MTBV 
variables retain their sign and significance and are included in the model to be 
estimated for the SIR.  All the measures of risk generated the expected positive signs, 
however only the implied volatility measures were significant. This implies that the 
SIR will be higher on days with relatively higher risk. 
The level of the SIR was found to be positively related to the open interest in 
the individual share options market.  Where the model is adapted to distinguish 
between call and put option open interest, however, it is the former that was found to 
be significant.  This could possibly be because option trading for hedging purposes is 
focused on one side of the call contract, whereas it involves both sides of the put 
contract.  The option market trading volume is not a significant in explaining the 
variance of the SIR; this result is robust to the inclusion of call and put trading volume 
individually.  
The influence of past stock and market returns on the SIR was quite different 
to the raw short sales volume version of the model.  Neither variable is statistically 
significant, whether they are included individually or jointly in the regression (not 
presented).  The interest rate spread was significant explanatory of variance in the 
SIR, this result is robust to the choice of maturity of the interest rate. The positive 
coefficient estimate is consistent with the notion that, following an increase in the 
Hong Kong – US interest rate spread, Hong Kong equities will become relatively less 
attractive in the eyes of investors. Given the currency board arrangement underlying 
the HK$, these spreads over the US interests rate may reflect a risk premium for Hong 
Kong. A widening of the spread is associated with heightened short selling relative to 
trading volume, in the expectation of reduced demand for Hong Kong shares.  
 
7  Are Short Sellers Momentum or Contrarian Traders? 
The evidence from Section 5 suggests that short sellers respond to past price 
information when making trading decisions.  In this section, we revisit this result in an 
attempt to provide further insights into how investors react to past price information.  
  20Diether et al (2005, p. 10) note that “virtually every book on short selling uses price-
pattern-based technical trading rules.” Thus, it is almost certain that at least some 
short sellers will base their decisions on past price information.  However, it is not 
clear over what time horizon they frame their decisions. On the one hand, it could be 
over a very short horizon, incorporating only the price movement from the previous 
day. Alternatively, it could be over a longer time horizon, perhaps 10 trading days or 
more. Further, it is also not clear what the nature of this relationship may be. If short 
sellers are momentum traders, a fall in prices may lead to an increase in short selling, 
as investors expect the downward price trend to continue.  On the other hand, where a 
contrarian investment strategy dominates, short sellers increase their positions 
following a positive return in anticipation of a reversal in the next period.   
To test whether short sellers are momentum or contrarian traders, the 
parsimonious regression model presented in the last column of Table 5 may be 
modified to allow for the different time horizons of investors.  Thus, in addition to the 
1 day returns already tested, returns estimated over a 2, 5 and 10 day window 
preceding the day of the short sale may also be tested.
16  For example, where W = 5, 
the return is the log change in price over the previous –1 to –5 days denoted as  ( ) W
t R 1 −  
for W=5.   
The results for each of the different return windows are presented in Panel A 
of Table 7 Panel A, where the log of short sales is specified.  Note that while the full 
model is estimated, the table only presents the estimated coefficients for the lagged 
return as well as past short selling (which has a high degree of explanatory power).  
The other coefficients are consistent with those reported in Table 5 and so further 
discussion is omitted.  The first row of results in Panel A, are the same as those 
presented for the full model in Table 5, where short sellers are assumed to have a very 
short time horizon and trade based on the past days return (W=1), the estimated 
coefficient is positive and significant.  Distinguishing between positive and negative 
returns,  -, it is possible to explore the symmetry of short selling responses to past 
price movements.  In this case, past returns are separated into past positive and 
negative returns.  Two new series are tested: 
() W
t R 1 −
( ) W
t R 1 − +, which takes the value of the 
                                                           
16 Note that Diether et al (2005) use adjusted returns in their analysis.  It is argued in the context of this 
study that this is inappropriate as to profit from a short selling strategy, the investor must identify a 
stock whose price falls and not just underperforms the market.  Thus, unadjusted returns data is the 
focus of analysis. 
  21return if it is positive and zero otherwise; and  ( ) W
t R 1 − - which takes the absolute value of 
the return if it is negative and zero otherwise.  Each of these two terms are included in 
a second version of our model and both coefficients are positive although only 
positive returns are significant.  A Wald test confirms that the estimated differences 
between these coefficients are statistically significant.  Recall that the short sales data 
includes both information based and non-information based trading.  Thus, only a 
portion of short selling will respond to recent price changes and a certain level of 
short selling will take place irrespective as to recent returns.  The positive sign on 
these asymmetry coefficients is consistent with this notion.  The fact that short selling 
is greater following positive returns however, is consistent with the contrarian 
hypothesis.  Short sales increase following positive returns as investors take positions 
in anticipation of a price reversal.  Thus, short sellers are contrarian traders.  In the 
context of the previous literature, this result is consistent with the results for the US 
market provided by Diether et al (2005).     
-Table 7 about here- 
It is possible that traders may consider returns over a longer time horizon 
when short selling.  As such, returns estimated over a window of the past 2, 5 and 10 
days are also considered. The coefficient for the past returns variable is positive and 
significant in each case. This suggests that short sales are responsive to returns over a 
2 day and longer time horizon. Where positive and negative returns are considered 
individually, the results mirror the one day returns results as the positive return 
coefficients are positive and significant in every case. Further, the Wald test shows 
that the positive coefficient is significantly greater than the negative coefficient in 
each case.   
To account for the possibility of any size effects biasing these results the 
previous analysis is repeated using the SIR as the dependent variable.  The results for 
this analysis are presented in Panel B of Table 7 and may be compactly summarized 
as follows.  Past returns generally have an insignificant impact on current period 
relative short sales volume. Distinguishing between positive and negative returns didd 
little to alter this result.  Only the positive return over a two day window was 
significant, however its sign was perverse. Thus, there is no compelling evidence of 
past returns being a factor in making the decision to sell short in the relative short 
sales data.  
  228  The Information Content of Short Selling 
Where short selling is driven by information, the information set may consist 
of past prices or some form of news about the company’s future prospects.  The 
previous section provides evidence of the former in that short sales are found to 
respond to past returns.  Where price rises, short sales will increase on the assumption 
of a price reversal.  Success for this strategy is simply the result of speculation that the 
market will not sustain the recent price trend.  Thus, these trades do not reveal any 
information to the market.  
Where traders are taking short positions on a superior (and possibly inside) 
information set
17, their trading will reveal that information to the market.  In this case, 
short selling may have predictive power for future returns.  Any such evidence 
however, should not be interpreted as an indication of the potential profits to short 
positions.  To draw such conclusions would require information on how long they 
hold their positions for.  Further, trading costs also need to be taken into account, 
which the literature suggests are significant and highly variable (see Cohen, Diether 
and Malloy, 2005).   
To provide some insights to the predictive power of short selling, the W period 
return in period  t+1 is regressed against information for day t, ie.  
1 , , 3 , 2 , 1 0
) (
1 , + + + + + + = t i t i t i t i
W
t i mtbv a mv a ss a a R ε     (3) 
Where     and   represent the logarithms of Short Sales, Market Value 
and Market to Book Value, respectively, for firm i at time t.  Fama and French (1992) 
show that firm size and the book to market ratio are important factors in explaining 
the cross sectional variation of returns. As such, the market value of the firm and 
book-to-market ratio of each firm are included as further explanatory variables.  The 
estimation results for this equation are presented in Panel A of Table 8 for W = 1, 2, 5 
and 10 days ahead returns where the errors are modeled as an AR(1) process.   
t i ss , t i mv , t i mtbv ,
-Table 8 about here- 
The estimation results for the one day ahead return produce a negative and 
significant coefficient on the short sales volume variable.  Thus, higher levels of short 
selling in the current period are associated with declines in returns in the following 
period.  This result is consistent with the previous literature, see Senchack and Starks 
(1993),  inter alia. To account for potential autocorrelation in short selling, this 
                                                           
17 Singal and Xu (2005) argue that short sellers possess superior information. 
  23equation was re-estimated to include the one period lead of the short sales term. The 
results show that the coefficient for the current period short sales variable remains 
negative and significant and so does not serve to alter the initial conclusion. It is 
interesting to note that the signs of these two variables are opposite which is 
consistent with the results of Diether et al (2005). Thus, where short sellers are 
building a position, positive returns are expected until such time as this trend changes, 
in which case negative returns are expected.   
Where 2, 5 and 10 day ahead returns are considered, none of the current period 
short sales terms are significant.  It is interesting to note that the one period ahead 
short sales term is significant in the control equation for the two day returns.  This 
result suggest that short selling in the following period leads to lower average returns 
in the following period and is consistent with the results for the one period return 
equation. Of the control variables, only the market to book value variable is 
significant for the longer time horizon return equations.   
In panel B of Table 8, the ability of the SIR to predict future returns is 
considered.  The results largely mirror those of Panel A insomuch as higher current 
period short sales suggest lower future returns in the next period. Of the control 
variables, market to book value is significant in all of the models tested. With the 
exception of the one period lead of SIR for two-day returns, none of the other return 
windows produced significant evidence of a predictive power in the relative short 
sales data. 
Taken together, the results of this section suggest that where short sellers are 
establishing a position in the market, higher short selling in the current period is 
associated with higher returns in the next period.  Once short sellers reduce their 
activity in the market however, negative returns are expected in the following period.  
In general, short sellers appear to have reasonably short time horizons as little 
evidence can be found of them either reacting to or influencing longer time horizon 
stock returns.  This evidence may help to explain why many past papers which use 
monthly data, have failed to establish any predictive power of short selling.  The 
information content of short sales may only extend to the next day (or even less as 




  249 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the determinants and information content of short 
selling in the Hong Kong equity market.  We argue that short selling results from the 
activities of both informed and uninformed traders. A number of variables are tested 
that are designed to capture the impact of various aspects of each group of traders on 
short sales volumes.  The results suggest that past levels of short selling, dividend 
payments, company fundamentals, risk, option market activity, the interest rate spread 
and past stock returns may all have some influence over the current level of short 
selling.  Further analysis of the influence of past returns on current short selling 
reveals that it is only immediate past price information which enters into the decision 
making function of short sellers.   
In the event that trading decisions on short positions are made based on 
company information, the level of short selling may have predictive power for future 
returns.  The results of the analysis in this paper are consistent with such a view. 
Where short sellers are taking a position against a stock, higher short selling in the 
current period is associated with higher returns in the next period.  Once short sellers 
reduce their activity in the market however, negative returns are expected in the 
following period.   
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Descriptive Statistics of Returns and Short Selling Data 
Stock  Stock  Panel A: Returns  Panel B:Short Sales 
Code Name  Mean  Maximum Minimum Std. 
Dev. 





-  Hang Seng  0.0001  0.0435  -   0.0929  0.0115  1092.0  -  -  -  - 
1  Cheung Kong  -0.0001  0.0671  -   0.1135  0.0169  305.8  80.51%  288,287 5,974,000 321,440,000 
2  CLP Holdings  0.0003  0.0387  -   0.0544  0.0079  1,271.3  58.48%  198,517 1,729,000 160,798,500 
4  Wharf Holdings  0.0003  0.0994  -   0.1382  0.0199  759.9  79.49%  292,072 3,072,000 321,571,000 
5  HSBC   0.0001  0.0664  -   0.0896  0.0112  5,676.0  81.23%  675,426 7,644,800 759,854,000 
6  HK Electric  0.0003  0.0439  -   0.0447  0.0096  483.8  59.28%  206,728 2,096,500 169,723,500 
8  PCCW  -0.0011  0.1214  -   0.1208  0.0221  835.1  71.48%  3,761,289 84,379,000 3,723,676,000 
11  Hang Seng Bank  -0.0000  0.0508  -   0.0688  0.0099  1,168.8  68.59%  174,793 2,677,300 166,052,900 
12  Henderson Land  0.0000  0.0974  -   0.0920  0.0199  371.9  83.68%  353,700 6,383,000 409,938,000 
13  Hutchison  -0.0002  0.0691  -   0.1370  0.0162  1,258.5  86.50%  491,340 5,715,000 588,625,000 
16  SHK Property  0.0000  0.0817  -   0.0907  0.0186  288.1  91.05%  473,892 5,292,000 597,578,000 
17  New World Dev.  0.0002  0.1308  -   0.1385  0.0276  473.2  64.04%  625,959 10,302,000 555,226,000 
19  Swire Pacific ‘A’  0.0002  0.0914  -   0.1308  0.0183  792.1  77.18%  174,049 2,363,000 186,058,500 
23  Bank of East Asia  0.0003  0.0883  -   0.0639  0.0142  752.8  58.63%  242,725 4,441,200 197,093,000 
267  CITIC   -0.0000  0.0896  -   0.1413  0.0181  2,828.4  57.26%  196,852 3,554,000 156,104,000 
291  China Resources  0.0003  0.0886  -   0.1318  0.0218  732.3  66.57%  331,091 11,328,000 305,266,000 
941  China Mobile  0.0000  0.1054  -   0.1106  0.0215  574.0  90.97%  1,259,885 11,839,000 1,587,455,500 
992  Lenovo Group  -0.0004  0.1289  -   0.1516  0.0281  362.3  73.14%  1,832,182 38,200,000 1,856,000,000 
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Table 2 






Relative to Traded  
Volume 
Relative to Shares  
on Issue 
Code  Name Average  Maximum  Minimum  Average  Maximum 
1  Cheung Kong  4.908% 39.216% 0.009%  0.012%  0.258% 
2 CLP  Holdings  6.202% 64.347% 0.014%  0.008%  0.072% 
4 Wharf  Holdings  7.840% 49.922% 0.015%  0.012%  0.126% 
5 HSBC    6.304% 44.200% 0.012%  0.007%  0.081% 
6 HK  Electric  7.170% 55.319% 0.008%  0.010%  0.098% 
8 PCCW  7.044%    59.496%  0.009%  0.024%  0.380% 
11  Hang Seng Bank  8.617% 48.715% 0.009%  0.009%  0.140% 
12 Henderson  Land  8.303% 52.359% 0.024%  0.020%  0.352% 
13 Hutchison  5.245% 35.583% 0.005%  0.012%  0.134% 
16 SHK  Property  8.499% 46.455% 0.013%  0.020%  0.220% 
17  New World Dev.  4.682% 48.274% 0.008%  0.023%  0.324% 
19  Swire Pacific ‘A’  6.744% 49.008% 0.016%  0.019%  0.254% 
23  Bank of East Asia  7.389% 67.969% 0.005%  0.017%  0.298% 
267 CITIC    4.464% 40.968% 0.026%  0.009%  0.162% 
291 China  Resources  5.962% 45.223% 0.031%  0.016%  0.565% 
941 China  Mobile  5.955% 43.407% 0.003%  0.006%  0.060% 
992 Lenovo  Group  7.773% 60.380% 0.009%  0.023%  0.449% 
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Autocorrelations of Short Selling 
Notes to Table: Statistical significance at the 5% level indicated as *. 
Lag 
Company  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Cheung Kong  0.338 *  0.206 *  0.079 *  0.075 *  0.100 *  0.030  0.087 *  0.075 *  -0.018  0.028 
CLP Holdings  0.243 *  0.189 *  -0.019  0.062 *  0.012  0.029  0.014  0.016  -0.018  0.032 
Wharf Holdings  0.309  *  0.136  *  0.035 0.013 0.034 0.022 0.019 0.052 0.031 0.088  * 
HSBC   0.415 *  0.207 *  0.048  0.118 *  0.071 *  0.098 *  -0.011  0.065 *  -0.019  -0.014 
HK Electric  0.289 *  0.143 *  0.112 *  0.061 *  0.051  0.137 *  0.014  0.033  0.077 *  -0.034 
PCCW  0.455 *  0.202 *  0.232 *  0.037  0.153 *  0.002  0.086 *  -0.008  0.022  0.109 * 
Hang Seng Bank  0.405 *  0.218 *  0.095 *  0.069 *  0.102 *  0.015  0.110 *  0.032  0.000  0.028 
Henderson Land  0.505 *  0.055 *  0.044  0.069 *  0.094 *  0.048  -0.010  0.033  0.076 *  0.006 
Hutchison  0.388 *  0.194 *  0.111 *  0.135 *  0.235 *  0.002  0.020  0.074 *  0.022  0.090 * 
SHK Property  0.376 *  0.163 *  0.054 *  0.025  0.051  0.120 *  0.020  0.001  -0.004  0.086 * 
New World Dev.  0.392 *  0.112 *  0.186 *  0.009  0.075 *  0.032  0.084 *  0.021  0.178 *  0.020 
Swire Pacific ‘A’  0.313 *  0.143 *  0.109 *  0.056 *  0.133 *  0.069 *  0.080 *  0.077 *  0.051  0.018 
Bank of East Asia  0.439 *  0.079 *  -0.017  0.023  0.009  0.077 *  0.084 *  0.030  -0.017  -0.018 
CITIC   0.311 *  0.149 *  0.026  0.028  0.063 *  0.115 *  0.031  0.014  0.048  0.076 * 
China Resources  0.258 *  0.148 *  0.103 *  0.085 *  0.124 *  -0.008  0.034  0.004  0.078 *  -0.066 
China Mobile  0.384 *  0.153 *  0.110 *  0.066 *  0.066 *  0.047  0.057 *  0.042  0.023  0.058 * 
Lenovo Group  0.408 *  0.102 *  0.076 *  0.101 *  0.171 *  -0.005  0.070 *  0.013  0.021  0.029 
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Table 4 
Short Selling Correlations 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17 
1  Cheung  Kong  1.00                  
2 CLP  Holdings  -0.03                     
3 Wharf  Holdings  0.13 0.15                  
4  HSBC    0.05  0.12 0.05               
5 HK  Electric  0.08 0.24 0.09 0.16                
6  PCCW  -0.02  0.05 0.14 0.01 0.11             
7  Hang  Seng  Bank 0.03  0.15 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.15            
8  Henderson  Land 0.04  0.03 0.08 0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.02           
9  Hutchison  0.20  0.01 0.03 0.12 0.04 -0.06 0.10 0.03           
10  SHK  Property  0.17  0.10 0.11 0.10 0.01 -0.08 0.10 0.15  0.19         
11  New  World  Dev.  0.08  0.05 0.09 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.18  0.00 0.13        
12  Swire Pacific ‘A’  0.09  0.08 0.16 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.15 0.04  0.06 0.08 0.10            
13  Bank of East Asia  0.08  0.01 0.00 0.06 0.05 -0.05 0.09 0.00  0.08 0.02 0.02 0.05          
14  CITIC    0.07 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.11        
15 China  Resources  0.05  0.05 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06      
16  China  Mobile  0.16 0.07 0.06 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.00    
17 Lenovo  Group  0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.08  0.17 0.15 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.17  
- Hang  Seng  -0.01  -0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 
 
 
 Table 5 
Pooled Hierarchical Regression Output  
This table presents the regression output for   where the independent variables (Xt) in each equation are 
specified in the left hand column. All regression equations include month dummy variables (not presented to conserve space). Standard 











































































DDividend Payment Date 
  
-0.1329 
(0.98)           
 
Dividend Yield 
   
-0.1925 
















(1.37)      
 
MTBV 




(0.49)      
 
Trading Range 
       
0.0423 
(2.73)    
 
ARCH 









Average Implied Volatility 
            
0.0061 
(4.78) 
R-squared  0.2626 0.2629 0.2627 0.2921 0.2674 0.263 0.2922  0.2924  0.2936  0.2934 0.2932 
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.1653 2.1659 2.1653 2.1111  2.158  2.166  2.1109 2.1091  2.1078  2.1102  2.1097 
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Dependent Variable : Log Short  Sales                   


























































































Log Option Open Interest  0.1655 











Log Call Option Open Interest   
0.0406 
(2.24)         
Log Put Option Open Interest    
0.1337 
(6.31)         
Log No. Option Trades    
0.1223 











Log No. Call Option Trades     
0.1087 
( 6   . 8 7 )      
Log No. Put Option Trades     
0.0894 
( 5   . 6 6 )      
Stock Return (-1)       
1.957 





Market Return (-1)        
4.4358 
(4.62)    
Interest Rate Spread         
0.0297 
(1.20)   
R-squared  0.3055 0.3063 0.3025 0.3004 0.3077 0.3084 0.3089 0.3084 0.3084 
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.0899 2.0911 2.0352 2.0326 2.0266 2.0279 2.0264 2.0278 2.0278 
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Table 6 
Short Interest Ratio 
This table presents the regression output for   where the independent variables (Xt) in each equation are 
specified in the left hand column. All regression equations include month dummy variables (not presented to conserve space). Standard 



























































( 0 .   9 1 )            
DDividend Payment Date 
  
0.0007 
( 0   . 1 1 )           
Dividend Yield 
   
-0.0046 
















(1.39)        
MTBV 














         
0.0005 
(0.62)      
ARCH 
          
0.6068 
(0.32)    
Implied Volatility 
           
0.0001 
(2.68)   
Average Implied Volatility 
             
0.0001 
(2.52) 
R-squared  0.3458  0.3459  0.3458 0.3502 0.3465 0.3481 0.3523 0.3523 0.3523  0.3525  0.3524 
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.2485  2.2484  2.2485 2.2378 2.2467 2.2429 2.2327 2.2329 2.2328  2.2327  2.2325 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable :  
SIR           









































































Log Option Open Interest 
0.0044 







Log Call Option Open Interest   
0.003 
( 3   . 4 4 )      
Log Put Option Open Interest    
0.0009 
( 0   . 9 5 )      
Log No. Option Trades    
-0.0003 
(0.92)      
Log No. Call Option Trades     
0.0012 
(1.56)     
Log No. Put Option Trades     
-0.0009 
(1.24)     
Stock Return (-1)      
-0.0178 
(0.58)    
Market Return (-1)       
-0.0574 
(1.15)  
Interest Rate Spread        
0.008 
(7.07) 
R-squared  0.3544 0.3545 0.3806 0.3557 0.3545 0.3546 0.3557 
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.2287 2.2289 2.1953 2.0821 2.2306  2.231  2.2249 Table 7  
Short Sales and Past Stock Returns 
This table presents the regression output for   where the 
independent variables (Xt) in each equation are specified in the left hand column. All 
regression equations include month dummy variables (not presented to conserve space). 












Panel A: Short Sales 
Variable C  SSt-1 
( ) W
t R 1 −   ( ) W
t R 1 − + ( ) W
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(0.89) 0.3087  2.1512 [0.0001] 
Panel B:  Short Interest Ratio  
Variable C  SIRt-1 
( ) W
t R 1 −   ( ) W
t R 1 − + ( ) W
t R 1 − -  R
































































(1.94) 0.3559  2.2251 [0.1052] 
 
 
  38Table 8 
The Predictive Ability of Short Sales 
This table presents the regression output for  . All 
regression equations include month dummy variables (not presented to conserve space). Standard errors are 
displayed as (.),, marginal significance levels are displayed as [.]. 
1 , , 3 , 2 , 1 0
) (
1 , + + + + + + = t i t i t i t i
W
t i mtbv a mv a ss a a R ε
Panel A: Short Sales 
Variable C  SSt SSt+1 MV  MTBV  D-W stat 
() W















































































Panel B: Short Interest Ratio 
Variable C  SIRt SIRt+1 MV MTBV  D-W stat 
() W
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  39Figure 1 
Total Short Sales across Sample Stocks and Hang Seng Index 
 
 
  40Figure 2 
Cumulative Short Sales for Selected Hong Kong Equities 
This figure presents the cumulative short sales volume for 5 of the equities included in the initial pilot 
program.  Note that as PCCW has a much greater level of cumulative short sales (2.55 bn. by 2001), the y-
axis was truncated to allow the detail for the other stocks to be seen.   
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